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"How to Steal a Diamond," by Matthew Hart (March, 1999)
In an arid region north of Cape Town, diamond theft is viewed as the proper work of man.
The major investors in the diamond mines realized that they had no alternative but to merge their interests into a single entity that would be powerful enough to control production and perpetuate the illusion of scarcity of diamonds. The instrument they created, in 1888, was called De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., incorporated in South Africa. As De Beers took control of all aspects of the world diamond trade, it assumed many forms. In London, it operated under the innocuous name of the Diamond Trading Company. In Israel, it was known as "The Syndicate." In Europe, it was called the "C.S.O." -- initials referring to the Central Selling Organization, which was an arm of the Diamond Trading Company. And in black Africa, it disguised its South African origins under subsidiaries with names like Diamond Development Corporation and Mining Services, Inc. At its height -- for most of this century -- it not only either directly owned or controlled all the diamond mines in southern Africa but also owned diamond trading companies in England, Portugal, Israel, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland.|
De Beers proved to be the most successful cartel arrangement in the annals of modern commerce. While other commodities, such as gold, silver, copper, rubber, and grains, fluctuated wildly in response to economic conditions, diamonds have continued, with few exceptions, to advance upward in price every year since the Depression. Indeed, the cartel seemed so superbly in control of prices -- and unassailable -- that, in the late 1970s, even speculators began buying diamonds as a guard against the vagaries of inflation and recession.
The diamond invention is far more than a monopoly for fixing diamond prices; it is a mechanism for converting tiny crystals of carbon into universally recognized tokens of wealth, power, and romance. To achieve this goal, De Beers had to control demand as well as supply. Both women and men had to be made to perceive diamonds not as marketable precious stones but as an inseparable part of courtship and married life. To stabilize the market, De Beers had to endow these stones with a sentiment that would inhibit the public from ever reselling them. The illusion had to be created that diamonds were forever -- "forever" in the sense that they should never be resold.
In September of 1938, Harry Oppenheimer, son of the founder of De Beers and then twenty-nine, traveled from Johannesburg to New York City, to meet with
Gerold M. Lauck, the president of N. W. Ayer, a leading advertising agency in
the United States. Lauck and N. W. Ayer had been recommended to Oppenheimer by
the Morgan Bank, which had helped his father consolidate the De Beers financial
empire. His bankers were concerned about the price of diamonds, which had
In Europe, where diamond prices had collapsed during the Depression, there seemed little possibility of restoring public confidence in diamonds. In Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain, the notion of giving a diamond ring to commemorate an engagement had never taken hold. In England and France, diamonds were still presumed to be jewels for aristocrats rather than the masses. Furthermore, Europe was on the verge of war, and there seemed little possibility of expanding diamond sales. This left the United States as the only real market for De Beers's diamonds. In fact, in 1938 some three quarters of all the cartel's diamonds were sold for engagement rings in the United States. Most of these stones, however, were smaller and of poorer quality than those bought in Europe, and had an average price of $80 apiece. Oppenheimer and the bankers believed that an advertising campaign could persuade Americans to buy more expensive diamonds.
Oppenheimer suggested to Lauck that his agency prepare a plan for creating a new image for diamonds among Americans. He assured Lauck that De Beers had not called on any other American advertising agency with this proposal, and that if the plan met with his father's approval, N. W. Ayer would be the exclusive agents for the placement of newspaper and radio advertisements in the United States. Oppenheimer agreed to underwrite the costs of the research necessary for developing the campaign. Lauck instantly accepted the offer.
In their subsequent investigation of the American diamond market, the staff of N. W. Ayer found that since the end of World War I, in 1919, the total amount of diamonds sold in America, measured in carats, had declined by 50 percent; at the same time, the quality of the diamonds, measured in dollar value, had declined by nearly 100 percent. An Ayer memo concluded that the depressed state of the market for diamonds was "the result of the economy, changes in social attitudes and the promotion of competitive luxuries."
Although it could do little about the state of the economy, N. W. Ayer
suggested that through a well-orchestrated advertising and public-relations
campaign it could have a significant impact on the "social attitudes of the
public at large and thereby channel American spending toward larger and more
expensive diamonds instead of "competitive luxuries." Specifically, the Ayer
study stressed the need to strengthen the association in the public's mind of
diamonds with romance. Since "young men buy over 90% of all engagement rings"
it would be crucial to inculcate in them the idea that diamonds were a gift of
love: the larger and finer the diamond, the greater the expression of love.
Similarly, young women had to be encouraged to view diamonds as an integral
part of any romantic courtship.
Since the Ayer plan to romanticize diamonds required subtly altering the
public's picture of the way a man courts -- and wins -- a woman, the advertising agency strongly suggested exploiting the relatively new medium of motion pictures. Movie idols, the paragons of romance for the mass audience, would be given diamonds to use as their symbols of indestructible love. In addition, the agency suggested offering stories and society photographs to selected magazines and newspapers which would reinforce the link between diamonds and romance. Stories would stress the size of diamonds that celebrities presented to their loved ones, and photographs would conspicuously show the glittering stone on the hand of a well-known woman. Fashion designers would talk on radio programs about the "trend towards diamonds" that Ayer planned to start. The Ayer plan also envisioned using the British royal family to help foster the romantic allure of diamonds. An Ayer memo said, "Since Great Britain has such an important interest in the diamond industry, the royal couple could be of tremendous assistance to this British industry by wearing diamonds rather than other jewels." Queen Elizabeth later went on a well-publicized trip to several South African diamond mines, and she accepted a diamond from Oppenheimer.
In addition to putting these plans into action, N. W. Ayer placed a series of lush four-color advertisements in magazines that were presumed to mold elite opinion, featuring reproductions of famous paintings by such artists as
Picasso, Derain, Dali, and Dufy. The advertisements were intended to convey the idea that diamonds, like paintings, were unique works of art.
BY 1941, The advertising agency reported to its client that it had already achieved impressive results in its campaign. The sale of diamonds had increased by 55 percent in the United States since 1938, reversing the previous downward trend in retail sales. N. W. Ayer noted also that its campaign had required "the conception of a new form of advertising which has been widely imitated ever since. There was no direct sale to be made. There was no brand name to be impressed on the public mind. There was simply an idea -- the eternal emotional value surrounding the diamond." It further claimed that "a new type of art was devised ... and a new color, diamond blue, was created and used in these campaigns.... "
In its 1947 strategy plan, the advertising agency strongly emphasized a
psychological approach. "We are dealing with a problem in mass psychology. We
seek to ... strengthen the tradition of the diamond engagement ring -- to make
it a psychological necessity capable of competing successfully at the retail
level with utility goods and services...." It defined as its target audience
"some 70 million people 15 years and over whose opinion we hope to influence in
support of our objectives." N. W. Ayer outlined a subtle program that included
arranging for lecturers to visit high schools across the country. "All of these
lectures revolve around the diamond engagement ring, and are reaching thousands
of girls in their assemblies, classes and informal meetings in our leading
educational institutions," the agency explained in a memorandum to De Beers.
The agency had organized, in 1946, a weekly service called "Hollywood
Personalities," which provided 125 leading newspapers with descriptions of the
diamonds worn by movie stars. And it continued its efforts to encourage news coverage of celebrities displaying diamond rings as symbols of romantic involvement. In 1947, the agency commissioned a series of portraits of "engaged
socialites." The idea was to create prestigious "role models" for the poorer
middle-class wage-earners. The advertising agency explained, in its 1948
strategy paper, "We spread the word of diamonds worn by stars of screen and
stage, by wives and daughters of political leaders, by any woman who can make
the grocer's wife and the mechanic's sweetheart say 'I wish I had what she has.'"
De Beers needed a slogan for diamonds that expressed both the theme of romance and legitimacy. An N. W. Ayer copywriter came up with the caption "A Diamond Is Forever," which was scrawled on the bottom of a picture of two young lovers on a honeymoon. Even though diamonds can in fact be shattered, chipped,
discolored, or incinerated to ash, the concept of eternity perfectly captured
the magical qualities that the advertising agency wanted to attribute to
diamonds. Within a year, "A Diamond Is Forever" became the official motto of De
In 1951, N. W. Ayer found some resistance to its million-dollar publicity
blitz. It noted in its annual strategy review:
The millions of brides and brides-to-be are subjected to at least two important pressures that work against the diamond engagement ring. Among the more prosperous, there is the sophisticated urge to be different as a means of being smart.... the lower-income groups would like to show more for the money than they can find in the diamond they can afford....
To remedy these problems, the advertising agency argued, "It is essential that these pressures be met by the constant publicity to show that only the diamond is everywhere accepted and recognized as the symbol of betrothal."
N. W. Ayer was always searching for new ways to influence American public
opinion. Not only did it organize a service to "release to the women's pages
the engagement ring" but it set about exploiting the relatively new medium of
television by arranging for actresses and other celebrities to wear diamonds
when they appeared before the camera. It also established a "Diamond Information Center" that placed a stamp of quasi-authority on the flood of
"historical" data and "news" it released. "We work hard to keep ourselves known
throughout the publishing world as the source of information on diamonds," N.
W. Ayer commented in a memorandum to De Beers, and added: "Because we have done
it successfully, we have opportunities to help with articles originated by others."
N. W. Ayer proposed to apply to the diamond market Thorstein Veblen's idea,
stated in The Theory of the Leisure Class, that Americns were motivated in their purchases not by utility but by "conspicuous consumption." "The
substantial diamond gift can be made a more widely sought symbol of personal
and family success -- an expression of socio-economic achievement," N. W. Ayer
said in a report. To exploit this desire for conspicuous display, the agency
specifically recommended, "Promote the diamond as one material object which can
reflect, in a very personal way, a man's ... success in life." Since this
campaign would be addressed to upwardly mobile men, the advertisements ideally
"should have the aroma of tweed, old leather and polished wood which is characteristic of a good club."
Toward the end of the 1950s, N. W. Ayer reported to De Beers that twenty years of advertisements and publicity had had a pronounced effect on the American psyche. "Since 1939 an entirely new generation of young people has grown to marriageable age," it said. "To this new generation a diamond ring is
considered a necessity to engagements by virtually everyone." The message had
been so successfully impressed on the minds of this generation that those who
could not afford to buy a diamond at the time of their marriage would "defer the purchase" rather than forgo it.
THE campaign to internationalize the diamond invention began in earnest in the mid-1960s. The prime targets were Japan, Germany, zand Brazil. Since N. W. Ayer
was primarily an American advertising agency, De Beers brought in the J. Walter
Thompson agency, which had especially strong advertising subsidiaries in the
target countries, to place most of its international advertising. Within ten
years, De Beers succeeded beyond even its most optimistic expectations,
creating a billion-dollar-a-year diamond market in Japan, where matrimonial
custom had survived feudal revolutions, world wars, industrialization, and even the American occupation.
Until the mid-1960s, Japanese parents arranged marriages for their children
through trusted intermediaries. The ceremony was consummated, according to
Shinto law, by the bride and groom drinking rice wine from the same wooden
bowl. There was no tradition of romance, courtship, seduction, or prenuptial
love in Japan; and none that required the gift of a diamond engagement ring.
Even the fact that millions of American soldiers had been assigned to military duty in Japan for a decade had not created any substantial Japanese interest in
giving diamonds as a token of love.
J. Walter Thompson began its campaign by suggesting that diamonds were a
visible sign of modern Western values. It created a series of color
advertisements in Japanese magazines showing beautiful women displaying their
diamond rings. All the women had Western facial features and wore European
clothes. Moreover, the women in most of the advertisements were involved in
some activity -- such as bicycling, camping, yachting, ocean swimming, or
mountain climbing -- that defied Japanese traditions. In the background, there
usually stood a Japanese man, also attired in fashionable European clothes. In
addition, almost all of the automobiles, sporting equipment, and other
artifacts in the picture were conspicuous foreign imports. The message was clear: diamonds represent a sharp break with the Oriental past and a sign of
entry into modern life.
The campaign was remarkably successful. Until1959, the importation of
diamonds had not even been permitted by the postwar Japanese government. When the campaign began, in 1967, not quite 5 percent of engaged Japanese women
received a diamond engagement ring. By 1972, the proportion had risen to 27
percent. By 1978, half of all Japanese women who were married wore a diamond;
by 1981, some 60 percent of Japanese brides wore diamonds. In a mere fourteen years, the 1,500-year Japanese tradition had been radically revised. Diamonds
became a staple of the Japanese marriage. Japan became the second largest
market, after the United States, for the sale of diamond engagement rings.
In America, which remained the most important market for most of De Beer's
diamonds, N. W. Ayer recognized the need to create a new demaind for diamonds among long-married couples. "Candies come, flowers come, furs come," but such
ephemeral gifts fail to satisfy a woman's psychological craving for "a renewal of the romance," N. W. Ayer said in a report. An advertising campaign could
instill the idea that the gift of a second diamond, in the later years of
marriage, would be accepted as a sign of "ever-growing love." In 1962, N. W.
Ayer asked for authorization to "begin the long-term process of setting the
diamond aside as the only appropriate gift for those later-in-life occasions
where sentiment is to be expressed." De Beers immediately approved the
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Copyright © 1982 by The Atlantic Monthly Company. All
The Atlantic Monthly; February 1982; Have You Ever Tried To Sell A Diamond?; Volume 249, No. 2; pages 23-34.